Over the last months many all-around “Linked In experts” cite the results of Game Theory in their calls for solutions in the Russian war against Ukraine. Here I would like to address three common fallacies:

• Putin’s war is irrational
• No negotiations with terrorists
• The US should clearly state their intentions in the case that Russia uses nuclear weapons

The Game Theory on the subject of war and peace is very rich and probably best represented in the works Aumann and Schelling who received a Nobel prize in 2005.

Is this war rational and can any war be rational?

Let me answer this one by directly citing Aumann from his Nobel address.

A person’s behavior is rational if it is in his best interests, given his information.

With this definition, can war be rational? Unfortunately, the answer is yes; it can be. In one of the greatest speeches of all time—his second inaugural—Abraham Lincoln said: “Both parties deprecated war; but one would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came.”

It is a big mistake to say that war is irrational. We take all the ills of the world—wars, strikes, racial discrimination—and dismiss them by calling them irrational. They are not necessarily irrational. Though it hurts, they may be rational. If war is rational, once we understand that it is, we can at least somehow address the problem. If we simply dismiss it as irrational, we can’t address the problem.

Should we negotiate with terrorists?

The legend is that “XYZ does not negotiate with terrorists” is deeply rooted in some sophisticated game theory. The reality is that “not negotiating with terrorists” came about in 1973 when members of a Palestinian militant organization took a group of hostages in the Saudi embassy in Khartoum. Among them two American diplomats. Asked at a press conference how his government would respond, Nixon replied that there will be “no negotiation with terrorists”. The following day the American hostages were killed. Since then, at least in the public eye this policy become a doctrine. However, behind the curtain’s governments have always negotiated with terrorists, UK with IRA or the US most recently on withdrawal with Talibans – and I would argue for the good.

It is possible to build a game theoretic setup where no negotiation with terrorists is an optimal strategy. However, these arguments do not hold true if conflicted sides have weapons of mass destruction at their disposal. After the war has started – coordination and communication between conflicted sides is the only way to avoid the bad equilibrium of mutual mass destruction. And if something, any form of communication among the conflicted sides can only help.

Should the US be transparent in describing their response in the case that Russia uses Nuclear weapons?

A formal game theoretic analysis of deterrence is complicated and requires a dynamic game with several stages. The study of credible deterrence is one of the focal points of the Schelling’s book “The Strategy of Conflict” where his analysis reveals that the optimal commitment strategy is to choose a probability of attack that is less than one. In other words, in the face of an enemy’s military escalation, a country should threaten to let the situation “slip out of hand” rather than commit to certain and fully spelled out retaliation strategy. In Schelling’s words, make “threats that leave some things to chance.” The reason is that a modest probability of war may be enough to deter the enemy’s attack, while at the same time credibility of such threats is easier to maintain the smaller is the own expected cost of these threats. Schelling thus suggested that a good way to meet enemy aggression is to engage in “brinkmanship” — slowly stepping up the probability of open conflict. And that is what we are observing in the behavior of the US. But in the behavior of Russia as well. Which gives me hope, since it is indicative that both sides behave in a rational way.

The point is that since each step is small, credibility of the threats can be sustained by the rage and fear that builds slowly against the opponent, and since the opponent can reduce the probability of conflict by relenting, the probability of conflict is kept lower that it would otherwise be. It also makes the internal struggles and justifications to the other side more difficult. I.e. it gets more difficult to Putin to justify in front of his own stake holders to go for a full blown nuclear escalation, since the West has not fully escalated. The above analysis implies that countries should keep the adversary guessing about their response to aggression, at the same time ensuring that forceful retaliation is regarded as a real option. Anther insight from the work of Schelling is scarier and that is that this stability is fragile. This balance of terror is maintained only if retaliation is sufficiently probable and harsh compared to the gains from occupation. Understanding the preferences, the costs and benefits of the other side is crucial for determining the limits of brinkmanship. And these limits change dynamically and an open war between nuclear superpowers can be ignited by changes in preferences as well as in technology and should not be ruled out. Self-centered calling the war Irrational Putin’s crazy war while judging it from your own preferences, value system and information available is not helping either.

Can we tell something about the future and the present of this war based on Game Theory?

One week ago, when the war just started I wrote here that this war will last long and my expectations have not changed on this one. I have also expected brinkmanship and gradual stepping up. I still share the same expectations. How and when the conflict will end is difficult to state – but we are not there yet and it will get much worse, before it gets better.

Another “prediction” is that I believe that there are more negotiations taking place than what meets the public eye. We live in the World where even though rational, it has become almost unacceptable to negotiate with adversaries. Thus, democratically elected governments, driven by their re-election goals, have to hold such negotiations hidden.

Finally, understanding the value system, preferences, costs as well as the technological progress of the other side is crucial for playing the brinkmanship game so that it would serve the purpose of nuclear deterrence and would not be a step towards a nuclear cataclysm. This line is thin and stability is very fragile. 

Wars and other conflicts are among the main sources of human misery and to cite Aumann again – War has been with us ever since the dawn of civilization. Nothing has been more constant in history than war. It’s a phenomenon, it’s not a series of isolated events. The efforts to resolve specific conflicts are certainly laudable, and sometimes they really bear fruit.